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Abstract—Digital forensics is becoming an important fea-
ture for many embedded devices. In automotive systems, digi-
tal forensics involves multiple electronic control units (ECUs)
used to support the connected and intelligent vehicle’s
technology. Digital evidence from these ECUs can be used in
forensics investigation and analysis. Such a mechanism can
potentially facilitate crash investigation, insurance claims and
crime investigation. Issues related to forensics include the
authenticity, integrity and privacy of the data. In this paper,
the security of the forensic process and data in automotive
systems is analysed. We propose an efficient, secure, privacy-
preserving and reliable mechanism to provide a forensics
data collection and storage process. A diagnostic application
for smart phones, DiaLOG, is incorporated in the proposed
process that uses a secure protocol to communicate the col-
lected forensic data to a secure cloud storage. The proposed
protocol for communicating forensic data is implemented to
measure performance results and formally analysed using
Scyther and CasperFDR with no known attack found.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicle forensics is becoming an important feature in
a vehicle’s design and operational life cycle. Interested
stakeholders include insurance claim investigators and law
enforcement who are interested in crime and crash incident
investigation. In recent years, the forensic feature has
been further used by insurance providers and companies
providing vehicles to their employees for business related
activities.
An Electronic Control Unit (ECU) is a microcontroller
that controls the operations of a car. In modern cars,
there can be around seventy ECUs that control the overall
operations of the vehicle [10]. Each ECU is responsible
for different operations, such as body control, engine
control and telematics. A telematics unit for example,
provides connectivity (Wi-Fi or cellular network) to the
car, through which the car is able to communicate with
the outside world [34]. The different ECUs are connected
within a car through networks such as Local Interconnect
Network (LIN) [30], Controller Area Network (CAN) bus
[13], FlexRay [15] and Media Oriented Systems Transport
(MOST) [16]. The networks operate at different baud rates
depending on the applications. The OBD-II (On-Board
Diagnostic) port is a port that interfaces the outside world
to the in-vehicle networks [31]. The port can be interfaced
with a Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or serial connection using the
ELM327 interface [6].
For digital automotive forensics, the two main and
commonly used features are the Event Data Recorder
(EDR) [1] and the insurance black box that works together
with a telematics unit [34]. Fig. 1 shows the related
nodes on CAN bus. An EDR is used to store data that
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Fig. 1. Nodes on CAN bus
is relevant to a crash incident. At least fifteen parameters
are stored in order to be recovered during the forensic
investigation [1], which include speed, seat belt status and
airbag deployment state. The data is continuously stored
and overwritten on the Random Access Memory (RAM)
of the EDR, and the storage to its persistent memory
(Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
(EEPROM) or flash memory) is triggered by a crash-like
reading, for example a sudden change in the speed. The
retrieval of data during the investigation is conducted by
reading the content of the EDR, either through the OBD-II
port or by physical extraction of the data memory of the
EDR. There is however, a possibility that the data fails
to be recorded due to a vehicle’s electrical failure, which
causes insufficient power to write to the EEPROM or flash
memory of the EDR. The second possibility of storage
failure is that the EDR module is defective. Whereas, an
insurance black box continuously transfers the relevant
parameters to the insurance company’s server through the
telematics unit, to monitor the driving style. The driving
style is used to determine the insurance policy premium
rate. A better and safer driving style will result in a
lower premium rate. However, there are unresolved issues
related to insurance black boxes, which include false data
being transmitted to the telematics unit or the server and
telematics data not being available.
A. Problem statement
(i) Current use of EDR and the insurance black box
in forensic evidence provides limited features. The EDR
gives a restricted number of parameters for analysis,
whereas the insurance black box and telematics unit do not
protect the privacy of the users. (ii) Although certain data
is compulsory to obtain a service, users do not have control
of the transmitted data and can not access it. (iii) The users
are therefore unable to verify the correctness of the data
being transmitted.
B. Contribution
In this paper, we propose DiaLOG, a mobile application
that can be used as a forensic support feature. DiaLOG
ensures only an authorised mobile device can be connected
to the car, and provides integrity protected data that can
be used for forensic investigation. It also protects the
privacy of users and gives them control of the data being
transmitted.
II. RELATED WORK ON AUTOMOTIVE
FORENSICS
Nillson et. al discussed about performing forensics
on in-vehicle networks [29]. They discussed an attacker
model and requirements for detection, collection and event
reconstruction. According to them, the features like di-
agnostic, firmware update, vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and
vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications are desir-
able and could be achieved wirelessly, but these features
introduced cyber attacks capability. In their forensic pro-
posal design, their goals are to detect events in the vehicle
(which require a device to detect, notify and store the
forensic evidence); to answer the required questions in
forensics (from the collected forensic data); and to obtain
the current state of the firmware version. In order to
perform this, a list of hashes of current firmware installed
on all ECUs needs to be accessible. Their proposal de-
scribed what to do, without providing any practical im-
plementation. During the presentation phase of forensics,
conclusions can be made from both the physical evidence
through EDR data and also digital evidence through the
network.
Hoppe et. al proposed a route reconstruction forensics
in a hit-and-run scenario [11]. They proposed two meth-
ods, i.e manual and semi automated. Firstly, a Global
Positioning System (GPS) receiver is installed in the car
and connected to the ECU through the CAN bus. Any
communication is logged in the data logger. The direc-
tions for navigation are displayed on the instrument panel
cluster for safety and comfort. By having this feature,
they propose to use it as forensic evidence by providing
route reconstruction. In the manual method, the data from
the data logger is manually analysed, and optimisation is
conducted by filtering data that are potentially relevant to
the incident. The semi automated method is by connecting
a prober to the navigation unit and to a graphical user
interface (GUI) to show the data read from the navigation
unit. It is an invasive method since there is a physical
connection to the unit required to get the relevant data. In
order to log all the communication to the data logger, a
large memory space is required. For example, according
to [33], it shows there are 63 CAN IDs just to identify
different operations of the car. A single operation is
represented by a single CAN ID. As an example, just
for the sideway acceleration sensor, there are 35 frames
per second. For a car without a navigation system or a
data logger, this might contribute to the cost of additional
installation.
Kowalick discussed in detail about the unaddressed
issues with automotive EDR [32] by the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administrator (NHTSA), which is under
the US Department of Transportation. Among the issues
are the EDR data ownership, authenticity, the security
at the time of crash and the chain of custody after the
crash incident, tampering and manipulation, how data can
be of use for civil/criminal proceedings, police’s access
authorisation on the data, possibility of developing EDR
into a driver-monitoring tool, and third party’s access
authorisation.
III. AUTOMOTIVE FORENSICS
In this section, we discuss use cases, storage, retrieval,
issues, security requirements and threat model of automo-
tive forensics.
A. Automotive forensics use cases
Commonly, forensic data is used during crash incidents
investigation. However, there are many other use cases
when forensic evidence and data logging could be useful.
As an example, a current trend adopted by insurance
companies is to set the insurance premium rate depending
on the driving style. The driving style of a driver is
sent through a telematics unit to the insurance company’s
server. In another example, available technology like eCall
service [3] is used during crash accidents, and can call
emergency contacts. The service transmits location and
time of accident to ensure rapid assistance. For criminal
investigations, the GPS information could be used [2] to
determine the location of a suspect.
Data logging can also be useful during car rental. Bob
goes to the car rental company and is given a car. Similar
to how the physical body checks are conducted, if Bob
can use a diagnostic feature, he can verify the status of
the ECUs, and the car as a whole (i.e. digital check).
If the car is in a good condition, then Bob agrees to
rent the car. Otherwise, Bob should notify the company
about the current condition and he has the choice whether
to rent the car or to choose a different car. If a crash
or accident happens later, both parties, Bob and the car
rental company, will have the evidence to prove the actual
situation. Similar to the car rental use case, a potential
buyer of a second hand car can conduct a diagnostic to
ensure that all the units are working correctly as suggested
by the seller.
For network intrusion, for example, an attacker, Mallory,
is able to access the in-vehicle network, via the CAN bus
network. He injects malicious messages to the CAN bus
to cause denial of service (DoS), or to manipulate the
operations of a car. The injection of malicious messages
into the CAN bus network may cause a change in the
normal frequency of messages [27], [28]. By having a data
logging system, a driver/owner could be notified about the
intrusion. Another example is in a valeting application, the
car key is left to the valet service. Users do not want the
valet to compromise their cars, either by trying to steal
stored private information, or trying to trace their future
locations by adding a malicious device (for example a USB
stick or a malicious ECU) or application on the car.
The final example use case is diagnostic data. If there
is any problem with the car, the car owner can conduct
a first step diagnostic before visiting a workshop to get
the problem solved. This will give a brief idea to the car
owner of what should be fixed and its estimated cost. They
can also benefit from assessing their driving styles from
the stored data, and perhaps modify their style to reduce
service costs and likelihood of accidents [12].
B. Storage of forensic data
The ECU could be the storage place for forensic data.
Although, in case of total disruption to the car (and/or
its units) caused by an accident, the data may not be
retrievable. The data in the EDR could be corrupted or
changed as a result of a bad retrieval technique [12], or it
could be tampered with before the storage, e.g. by hacking
the CAN bus and injecting malicious data. The cloud or
a remote server could be a safe place to store forensic
data, as long as the data is recoverable and protected from
unauthorised access. The vehicle user should have control
of what data is shared with third parties via the cloud or
server. A mobile device could be another potential place
to store the forensic data, however there are concerns on
the tamper resistance of data since a mobile is easily
accessible compared to an EDR. A mobile device would
be a potential solution for a non-intrusive retrieval method.
Compared to data retrieval directly from the car’s black
box, retrieving data from a mobile device or a cloud would
only involve logical digital access rather than physical
access. It is a user-friendly method and can be used as
a first hand/first impression forensic result, and it reduces
the possibility of causing any changes to the actual ECU
that could invalidate the evidential data. The mobile could
also be used as a backup or complementary unit for the
EDR, as there are known problems related to the black
box including failure to record, software and cable faults,
OBD port retrieval issues, technical/training problems and
permission issues [12]. Compared to an EDR, the mobile
having a GUI through the application can help ensure that
the data is always available. The owner or driver can also
protect his interests by having the first hand forensic data.
Forensic data are usually difficult to retrieve (requiring
specialised tools and technical expertise if stored in the
car). By having the data in the mobile device, the data
is always available, where the owner or driver can have
easy access, however, the data must be protected from any
malicious tampering.
C. Data retrieval of forensic data
Parties interested in retrieving forensic data would in-
clude the law enforcement, lawyers, investigators (for
insurance or police), and car manufacturers, as well as the
vehicle owner/user. Law enforcement may be interested
in the data to determine causes in accidents. Vehicle
manufacturers may use this information in order to im-
prove their vehicle designs and performance, and where
possible to avoid or minimise the causes of accidents.
State and highway officials maybe interested in the data to
evaluate road conditions and safety. The driver or the car
owner might be interested in the vehicle data, but may
also attempt to modify or corrupt this data to conceal
wrongdoing.
Data stored in a black box can be retrieved in three
possible ways: firstly, through physical connection to the
OBD-II port, then logically accessing the black box from
the CAN bus; secondly, through physical connection to the
ECU, then logically accessing the EEPROM or flash mem-
ory from the black box operating system and application;
and finally, data can also be accessed through physical
connection to the ECU’s EEPROM or flash memory and
conducting a memory dump. If the data is stored on a
server, only authorised parties are able to retrieve the data.
D. Issues related to automotive forensics
A number of issues related to automotive forensics. One
issue is on the privacy of data. The existing telematics
unit provides connectivity to the car and sends the forensic
data directly to a server (for example insurance black box)
without the owner knowing what is transmitted. The access
control authorisation of data should really be given to
the owner although certain data is compulsory to obtain
a service. There is a campaign to try and establish this
right [7]. The owner also needs access to the stored and
transferred data to verify that it is correct. It is also
necessary to consider technical and security issues. The
retrieval of data currently requires expensive specialised
tools and expertise [12], although anyone can attempt to
access private data via the vehicle network, accessible
through the OBD-II port. Integrity and correctness of the
stored data could not be verified in the existing system.
The availability of data could be compromised if the
automotive forensics is only relying on the availability of
the EDR data [1].
E. Security and privacy requirements
From previous discussion, we conclude the security and
privacy requirements for automotive forensics as follows:
(i) Integrity: It is crucial to determine if the data stored
is not being tampered with or corrupted.
(ii) Authenticity: Data must be original and the person
handling the data is authorised.
(iii) Availability: Ensuring all the required data is avail-
able for investigation, and updated all the time.
(iv) Reliability: Having a backup device for forensic data
storage can increase the reliability of the forensic
system.
(v) Privacy: It is important to protect the privacy of the
car owner, especially when handling privacy-related
data such as driving habits.
F. Vehicle forensics threat model
In automotive forensics, assets to protect are the read
and write access authorisation and the authentication,
integrity and privacy of the data. Potential attackers are un-
trustworthy workshops, owners, investigators and hackers
with financial motivation. In our threat model, a malicious
entity: (i) can access the CAN bus and manipulate the con-
tent before the storage (ii) can access and manipulate the
content after the storage (iii) cannot break well-established
cryptographic algorithms.
A number of possible attacks for automotive forensics
can be conducted as follows:
(i) Denial of service (DoS) attack: To cause availability
issue, where data stored is not able to be retrieved,
or data not able to be stored. Denying access of data
to an authorised party is also a method of DoS.
(ii) Impersonation attack: To impersonate an authorised
party to conduct further attacks. For example, an
attacker impersonating an authorised person to ac-
cess the data during investigation to manipulate the
content, or a device impersonating an authorised
tool to access the data during the storage (i.e CAN
bus manipulation). This will violate the authenticity
requirement. Further attacks could lead to the viola-
tion of all other security requirements mentioned in
section III-E.
(iii) Data manipulation attack: To change the content of
the forensic data, either by changing the data before
or after the storage, or during the retrieval process.
This will violate the integrity property. Attacks can
be performed mechanically by simply destroying the
black box and its data contents. Attacks might also
be mounted electrically which will cause disruption
or change of data. Attacks through malicious CAN
bus messages might distract the driver, or hack the
engine or brake operation, or cause a crash and then
erase all traces from the black box.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
Commonly, during vehicle forensic investigation, the
EDR, the infotainment unit and other ECUs are analysed
[1]. In this proposal, the mobile application, DiaLOG, will
be the backup data for the EDR and other related data that
might be of interest for forensics.
Our proposal is based on the EVITA project [9], which
proposed an embedded Hardware Security Module (HSM)
in the ECU to ensure secure communications for on-board
system. As proposed in the EVITA project, each ECU has
its own HSM. This suggests that any node communicating
through the CAN bus is required to have access authorisa-
tion in order to send or receive messages. In our proposal,
the mobile device acts as a communicating node through
the CAN bus, and so requires access authorisation.
To conduct a diagnostic on the car, the mobile device is
connected to the OBD-II port via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Once
connected, the mobile device will be authenticated, to
determine whether it is authorised to retrieve the requested
data. Once authenticated, the mobile device is connected
to the CAN bus, and able to access the required data.
The main idea of the DiaLOG application is to read
the DTCs (Diagnostic Transmission Code) and log them
securely. The DTCs can be read by the user of the DiaLOG
application, and from there, the user is aware of the car’s
condition and state.
A. Assumptions
The assumptions of the proposed DiaLOG application
are as follows: The mobile application is installed on
a mobile device and the mobile device is available for
investigation. The data is always automatically transmitted
to the phone and later to the cloud. If data is not updated
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Fig. 2. Architecture of the proposed framework
after a certain time, the owner will be notified. Finally,
the cloud is securely managed. A user is authenticated to
access the cloud server, and only authorised users have
access to the data. However, even if an attacker is able to
get access to the data in the cloud, our protocol protects
the integrity and confidentiality of the data.
B. The DiaLOG application
The architecture of the proposed framework with mobile
application and cloud based backup storage is shown in
Fig. 2. A mobile device with the DiaLOG application can
log the latest vehicle operations. This data is uploaded to
the cloud when a suitable network connection is available.
From this framework, the forensic investigators have the
options to get the data from three different sources: the
car EDR, the mobile device or the cloud. The car owner
(having the DiaLOG application and access to the forensic
data) has control of what data to share with third parties.
Certain data is compulsory to obtain a service and the car
owner will need to give access to the service provider.
However, he/she has the control of the transmitted data
and can verify the correctness of data. The proposed
architecture safeguards the privacy of the car owner/driver,
in a way that is not possible with the current system
that transmits data via the telematics unit. The keys for
the mobile device are stored in a secure memory for
example on a secure element, or the mobile device could
be supporting TrustZone. The keys for the CCU are stored
in the HSM of the CCU.
1) Authentication phase: In order to use the DiaLOG
with the mobile device, the mobile device is required to
be authenticated to the car. Only the authorised mobile
device is given permission to access the data from the car,
and most importantly to connect with the car’s internal
network. An authorised device is divided into two different
levels: basic or full authorisation. These levels will be
further explained in Section IV-C.
2) Diagnostic phase: In this phase, the mobile device
is connected to the vehicle through a Wi-Fi connection,
via an on-board router. The mobile device needs to be
authenticated to the vehicle to ensure only authorised
mobile devices are permitted to acquire the vehicle’s
diagnostic data. If authentication is successful, the mobile
device will send a diagnostic command to the ECU, and
the mobile will receive the resulting data. This operation
is automated once connection is established and authenti-
cation is verified. This way, the driver is always aware of
his/her vehicle condition. Apart from that, the consistency
of data can be maintained between the mobile application
and the vehicle.
3) Data logging: Data to be logged in the DiaLOG
application are as follows:
(i) DTCs: are the error codes associated with the compo-
nents in the vehicle. The main function of a diagnostic
is to read the DTCs and to resolve the associated
problems of the vehicle according to the codes.
(ii) ECU content is the firmware, application and data
available in each ECU. To retrieve all the data in
all the ECUs would be time consuming and require
a large memory to store it all. The (concatenated)
hashed value of each ECU can be stored to provide
an integrity check. Using the architecture as proposed
in the EVITA project [9], the master ECU contains
all the hashed values of all the ECUs. Any changes
in the content of the ECUs, i.e. any write operation to
the flash, will change the hashed value stored in the
master ECU. Hence, the master ECU is also alerted
of the changes. The DiaLOG application data is also
being updated accordingly.
(iii) Interface connection: to the vehicle is logged in
the DiaLOG application. The authentication process
from the interface connection will also be logged by
DiaLOG to get the identity of the entity involved. The
identification, authentication method, interface, time
and location, which is related to the communication
events (for example firmware update) are among the
relevant data to be logged.
(iv) Crash-like data: There are two different ways the
EDRs record the crash incident data. The first option
is by continuously recording and overwriting the data
on the EDR EEPROM/flash. The second option is
by recording the data only when there is crash-
like data. Similar to an EDR, crash-like parameters
such as a sudden change in the velocity, could be a
triggering factor for the DiaLOG application to start
recording the required parameters for crash incidents.
Triggering uses less mobile battery than continuous
polling of data.
(v) Change in the frequency of messages through the
CAN bus: could be an indicator of a potential remote
attack being conducted. DiaLOG will record the
normal frequency of messages and compare to the
current operational frequency.
4) Storage to cloud: The user can transfer the data
from the mobile device to the cloud. For example, after
each driving cycle, all data is transferred to the cloud as
a storage backup. At any required time, the data can be
retrieved and analysed.
5) During forensics: Requirements during forensics in-
clude (i) Availability of mobile application data, (ii) Avail-
ability of ECU data, (iii) Authenticity, integrity and cor-
rectness of data. The latest diagnostic data stored in
the mobile device is read during data collection. The
ECU data, including the EDR is also read. During the
forensic analysis process, this data is compared to ensure
its consistency.
C. Protocols
There will be two levels of mobile device authorisation
with different data access: basic and full, as shown in Table
I. The protocol notations are shown in Table II.
1) Protocol description: There are two protocols de-
pending on the different access authorisation.
TABLE I
CREDENTIALS FOR READ ACCESS
Data User
Car owner Car rental Potential buyer Investigator
DTC 4 4 4 4
Hash chains 4 4 4 4
External device 4 8 8 4
Crash data 4 8 8 4
Bus attack 4 8 8 4
Crash history 4 4 4 4
Authorisation Full Basic Basic Full
TABLE II
PROTOCOL NOTATIONS
CCU Central Communication Unit
Mo Mobile device of car owner (full authorisation)
Mt Mobile device for temporary access (basic authorisation)
kmc Symmetric key for CCU (shared between Mo and CCU)
ktemp Symmetric key shared between Mt and Mo
idMo Identification number of mobile device of car owner
idMt Identification number of mobile device for temporary access
idccu Identification number of CCU
ks Temporary symmetric key shared between mobile device and CCU
pkccu Public key of CCU used to verify signature
skccu Private key of CCU used to sign
nc, nMo, nMt Nonces
reqdtc Request to access DTC
dtc Diagnostic Transmission Code
ENC Encryption using AES128
sign Signature using RSA1024
(i) Full authorisation: For a full authorisation, the in-
tended entity (e.g. the car owner) is required to
be registered with the car manufacturer. After the
installation of the DiaLOG application, a registra-
tion process is proposed. By registering, the mo-
bile device, Mo, will have access to the car via a
set of keys (kmc and pkccu) provided by the car
manufacturer. Car owners and law enforcement are
given full authorisation provided they are registered
with the car manufacturer. The key is a symmetric
key shared between the mobile device and the car,
kmc. CCU is the central unit that interfaces the
communication of the in-car ECUs to the outside
world. The symmetric key, kmc, is a medium term
key that requires an update from the car manufacturer.
It will be used to authenticate the mobile device to
the car’s CCU. Referring to Table III, the mobile
device Mo will start the protocol by sending its ID,
concatenated with an encrypted message using the
pre-shared key kmc containing ID of CCU, request
to access the data and a generated nonce nMo. The
CCU will then reply with its ID, concatenated with
an encrypted message using the pre-shared key kmc
containing ID of CCU, nonce from Mo from previous
message, nMo and a session key ks. After a mutual
authentication and freshness verification (Step 1-2),
the mobile device will request the DTC from CCU.
The dtc transmitted from CCU will then be encrypted
to provide confidentiality and signed to ensure its
integrity.
(ii) Basic authorisation: Entities included in this group
are for example, anyone interested to rent a car from
a company, or a potential buyer when a car is being
resold. In order to be given access authorisation,
the person interested is required to acquire a set of
keys from the car owner. The key is transmitted and
TABLE III
FULL AUTHORISATION DATA ACCESS
1. Mo→ CCU : idMo||ENCkmc{idccu||fullreq||nMo}
2. CCU →Mo : idccu||ENCkmc{idMo||ks||nMo}
3. Mo→ CCU : idMo||ENCks{idccu||reqdtc}
4. CCU →Mo : ENCks{idccu||dtc}||signskccu{ENCks{idccu||dtc}}
TABLE IV
BASIC AUTHORISATION DATA ACCESS
1. Mt→Mo : idMt||idMo||ENCktemp{idccu||basicreq||nMt}
2. Mo→ CCU : idMo||idccu||ENCkmc{idMt||basicreq||nMo||nMt}
3. CCU →Mo : idccu||idMo||ENCkmc{idMt||ks||nMo||nc||nMt}
4. Mo→Mt : idMo||idMt||ENCktemp{idMt||idccu||ks||nc||nMo||nMt}
5. Mt→ CCU : idMt||idccu||ENCks{idMt||idMo||idccu||nc||reqdtc}
6. CCU →Mt : ENCks{idccu||dtc}||signskccu{ENCks{idccu||dtc}}
stored in the mobile device of the interested party.
It is then used to authenticate the mobile device to
the car. Basic authorisation only gives limited data
accessibility as described in Table I. The key, ks is
only valid per transaction, i.e. once communication
is disconnected, a new key is required to access the
data again.
Prior to the start of the protocol, both mobile devices
(Mo and Mt) share a symmetric temporary key,
ktemp and public key of CCU, pkccu. Referring to
Table IV, the temporary mobile device, Mt, will
request an access to the car from an authorised
mobile device (car owner’s), Mo. Mt will send its
ID, concatenated with idMo, and encrypted message
using the preshared ktemp containing the CCU’s ID,
the request and a nonce, nMt. The car owner’s mobile
device will then send a message to notify the CCU
about the temporary device’s request which contains
its ID, CCU’s ID concatenated with an encrypted
message using kmc containing the temporary mobile’s
ID, the request, nonces nMo and nMt. The CCU will
then acknowledge this by sharing ks to the owner’s
mobile device. The owner’s mobile device will then
reply to Mt with its ID and the temporary mobile’s
ID, concatenated with an encrypted message contain-
ing idMt, idccu, ks and all the nonces nc, nMo, nMt.
Now, the temporary mobile device can communicate
with the CCU using the ks. It will request the DTC
and the CCU will reply with an encrypted DTC plus
a signature to provide confidentiality and integrity.
D. Security Analysis
1) Informal analysis: Based on the security require-
ments in Section III-E, the proposal addresses them as
follows:
(i) Integrity: The DTCs being transmitted and stored are
signed by CCU to ensure that the DTCs are integrity
protected.
(ii) Authenticity: of the communicating parties are ver-
ified for every protocol transaction. They are given
access depending on the different levels of permis-
sion.
(iii) Availability: of the data is ensured by the update
of data every time the authorised mobile device is
connected to the car. The data on the cloud will be
automatically updated once connection is available,
or whenever the owner is notified.
(iv) Reliability: of the forensic system is improved by
having a backup data on the cloud as well as on the
mobile phone. If any of the stored data in the three
different components does not match to each other,
it shows that the data might be potentially corrupted.
(v) Privacy: of the car owner and its driving related data
is protected. The owner has the control over the data.
Based on the threat model in Section III-F, the proposal
addresses them as follows:
(i) Denial of service (DoS) attack: The data is always
automatically transmitted to the phone and later to
the cloud. If data is not updated after a certain time,
the owner will be notified. Having a backup copy
of the data can ensure that the data is available
to be retrieved if the person is authorised. If the
owner himself is the attacker, the data can always be
accessible directly through the car’s CCU or the EDR.
If the investigator is able to get to the mobile device
or the cloud data, then the data is always available.
(ii) Impersonation attack: Data can be retrieved by any
entity having the correct authorisation, whether it is
a full authorisation or a basic authorisation. Instead of
using specialised tools, a mobile application provides
easy data access without sacrificing authenticity of
the person/tool in use.
(iii) Data manipulation attack: The content uploaded on
the mobile device and cloud are integrity-protected by
the use of signature by the CCU. Furthermore, since
this proposal uses a mobile device, the cloud and also
the ECU as the storage device to store the required
data, there are three different components to verify
the consistency of the data. All three components
(ECU, mobile device and cloud) should have the same
content of data. However, if content is manipulated
by injecting malicious data through the CAN bus,
all three components would have the same falsified
data. However, our proposal is based on the EVITA
project [9], where each ECU contains its own HSM
and the communication through the CAN bus requires
authentication. Therefore, any nodes communicating
through the CAN bus are authorised.
2) Formal Analysis: The protocol is analysed using
formal analysis tools to attain indicative results regarding
its security. CasperFDR [14] and Scyther [5] tools are used
to verify the protocol. The required security requirements
include confidentiality of the secret keys, kmc and ks,
and the authentication properties, which include aliveness,
agreement and synchronisation. The full scripts can be
found in the link: CasperFDR and Scyther input scripts.
For CasperFDR, the security properties verified are
the secrecy, aliveness and agreement. The confidentiality
property is to verify the secrecy of the ks and kmc,
that are shared between the mobile device and the CCU.
The aliveness property is to verify the aliveness between
mobile device and CCU. The agreement property is to
ensure the agreement of ks shared between mobile device
and CCU. The intruder has the knowledge of all the
entities (CCU, Mo and Mt) and the request messages to
access the data (fullreq, basicreq and reqdtc). Referring
to CasperFDR full authorisation script, the script starts
with #Free variables declaration, which declares all the
variables used in the protocol. It is followed with the
#Protocol description. This describes the messages be-
ing transmitted (in sequence) during the authentication
and diagnostics, which starts with a request from MD
to the CCU (i.e 1.a->b:a,{b,fullreq,nmo}{kab}). In 5.a-
>b:a,reqdtc,{b,reqdtc}{ks}, the MD requests the dtc after
being authenticated and verified the freshness in mes-
sages 1-4. In the #Processes, all the involved entities
in the protocol and their knowledge are declared. For
example INITIATOR(a,b,kab,nmo,fullreq,reqdtc), where a
is the MD, b is the CCU and nmo is the random
nonce generated by MD. MD knows kab which is pre-
shared. The #Specification declares all the assertions
made to verify the security properties. The confidentiality
of kmc and ks are declared as Secret(a,kab,[a,b]) and
Secret(b,ks,[a,b]). As an authentication verification, the
aliveness property and the agreement property between
MD-CCU are verified. The #Actual variables section de-
scribes the names of the actual agents, and the actual
variables such as MD and CCU. Nothing is declared in the
#Functions section. The #System section again declares
all the involved entities in the protocol and their knowl-
edge, but with their actual names. For example, INITIA-
TOR(MD,CCU,KAB,Nmo,FULLREQ,REQDTC). The #In-
truder Information declares the intruder X who has the
knowledge of all the entities involved, i.e IntruderKnowl-
edge={MD,CCU,X,FULLREQ,REQDTC}. All the specifi-
cations made are verified and no attack is found for all the
assertions.
For Scyther, the security properties verified are the non-
injective synchronisation, non-injective agreement, weak
agreement, aliveness and secrecy. The default verification
setup was used (i.e. five as the maximum number of
runs, type matching and to find the best attack with ten
maximum patterns per claim). The secrecy property is to
verify the confidentiality of the ks and kmc, that are shared
between the mobile device and the CCU. Non-injective
synchronisation property is to verify that parties know who
they are communicating with, agree on the content of the
messages and the order of the messages. The non-injective
agreement is to verify that parties agreed on the content
of the variables. In Scyther, all the security properties are
modeled as role-based. Each entity is considered as one
role. The properties are viewed from the local view of
each role. Referring to Scyther basic authorisation script,
the script starts with functions declarations. Then, we
have macros of messages to make the script neat and
easy to be followed. Next, the events and claims are
made for each role (starts with MT, followed by MO and
CCU). For example, for MT role, the events are send 1
(mt,mo,m1), recv 4 (mo,mt,m4), send 5 (mt,ccu,m5) and
recv 6 (ccu,mt,m6), which means MT sends the macro
m1 to MO and later, receives macro m4 from MO and
sends macro m5 to CCU to then receive macro m6 from
CCU. Claims are the security properties to be verified.
For example, for the MT role, claim R4 (mt, Secret,
ks ) and claim R6 (mt,Secret, k(mo,mt)) are for confi-
dentiality. Authentication properties are verified through
Agreement (such as claim x3 (mt, Weakagree), claim x5
(mt, Niagree)), Synchronisation (claim x4 (mt, Nisynch)),
and Aliveness (claim x6 (mt, Alive)). The results for all
the claims made are verified as “Ok” in the “Status”
with “Verified” and “No attacks” in the “Comments”.
This means that no attack was found within the bounded
or unbounded statespace; the security property has been
successfully verified [4].
E. Implementation
The proposed protocol was then implemented on a PIC
Microchip microcontroller (PIC32MZ2048ECM144) and
an Android device to obtain indicative performance results.
1) Implementation platform: Our approach of imple-
mentation is to observe the computation time on both
the CCU and the mobile device separately. The mobile
device communicates via Wi-Fi, while the CCU commu-
nicates via CAN bus. There is a Wi-Fi module connected
to the CCU to receive the Wi-Fi messages from the
mobile device and convert these messages into UART
messages. There is another interface module between the
Wi-Fi module and the CCU to translate UART messages
into CAN messages and vice versa. Figure 3 shows the
connection setup for CCU’s communication. The CCU is
simulated using a microcontroller with all the functions
required to be an actual ECU with cryptographic engines.
PIC32MZ2048ECM144 [26] is chosen as the implementa-
tion platform for CCU. It is a 32 bit microcontroller with
2048 KB of flash and 512 KB of SRAM, and operates at
200 MHz clock. It supports CAN bus communication, as
required in an ECU. The hardware cryptographic engines
support the computation of cryptographic algorithms to
produce faster performance. For the mobile device, the
application protocol is loaded into a LG Nexus 5 with
a Quad-core 2.3 GHz Krait 400 CPU running on An-
droid 5.1. There are two platforms used as the interface
module to translate UART-CAN messages to compare
different platform performance. They are PIC18F4580
and PIC32MZ2048ECM144. PIC18F4580 [18] is an 8 bit
microcontroller with 32 KB of flash and 256 bytes of
RAM. It operates with a 16 MHz clock and supports CAN
bus and UART communication. For the Wi-Fi module, the
Wi-Fi G demo board [25] is used.
CCUInterface moduleWi-Fi
module (PIC32MZ or PIC18F) (PIC32MZ)
UART CAN
Fig. 3. CCU’s setup for communication
2) Experiment setup: For the CCU setup, the simula-
tion of the messages from and to the mobile application
is using the Microchip CAN bus analyser tool [20]. The
tool can be used to observe the messages sent from the
PIC32MZ microcontroller and also send messages to it.
On the PIC32MZ part, the PIC32MZ2048ECM144 starter
kit [24] is connected to a CAN PICtail daughter board [21]
through a starter kit adapter [23] and an I/O expansion
board [19]. The CAN PICtail daughter board is then
connected to the CAN bus analyser. The setup is shown in
Fig. 4. The CCU’s computation performance is measured
based on cycle count given by MPLABX debugger.
The same setup is used for the interface module using
PIC32MZ. For interface module using PIC18F4580, an
additional CAN transceiver, MCP2551 [17], is connected
to the PIC18. The interface module is then connected to
MCP2200 breakout module [22] to observe the UART
messages. The performance of communication is measured
using oscilloscope. The performance of Wi-Fi commu-
nication is measured using “Inspector” feature from the
internet browser.
Fig. 4. Lab setup for CCU’s CAN bus communication
3) Performance results: Based on the proposed proto-
col, the length of a message is more than eight bytes,
hence, all the messages will need to be divided into more
than one CAN message due to the limited number of bytes
(8 bytes) of data per CAN message transmission. The
messages are divided into three to eighteen messages to be
transmitted via CAN. The computation and communica-
tion performance for full and basic authorisation protocols
is as shown in Table V. The communication includes the
transfer of data from Wi-Fi module to the middle interface
module (via UART) and from middle interface module
to the CCU (via CAN). Based on the results, it can be
observed that the performance for the interface module
is almost the same for the different platforms used. This
is because both the devices use the same baud rates of
communication, i.e for UART (at 9600 bps) and CAN (at 1
Mbps). The communication time can be further improved
if CAN FD [8] is used, where one message can contain
up to 64 bytes of data, instead of just 8 bytes.
V. CONCLUSION
As car operations are digitally controlled, security is
now part of the main consideration in the automotive
systems implementation. Our proposal is based on the new
ECU architecture where a HSM is included in the ECU.
By having a mobile application as a logging platform for
the vehicle operation, it can help the forensic investigation
to be more effective. More data options can be stored
and thus increase the accuracy of forensic analysis. A
secure framework for vehicle forensics is proposed to
ensure the security of data and at the same time protect
the users’ privacy. The DiaLOG application proposed uses
a new framework of automotive forensics, which provides
usability and reliability. Our future work is to include more
logging features on the DiaLOG application as discussed
in Section IV-B3.
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